The Thai Financial Crisis And The Sufficiency Economy Philosophy by Bunyasrie, Vilasinee
International Business & Economics Research Journal – August 2010 Volume 9, Number 8 
7 
The Thai Financial Crisis  
And The Sufficiency Economy Philosophy 
Vilasinee Bunyasrie, Bangkok University International College, Thailand 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article revisits the financial crisis in 1997 using the sufficiency economy philosophy bestowed 
by His Majesty the King Bhumibol Adulyadej, shading some light on what went wrong, the lessons 
learnt, and possibly what can be done to prevent such crisis from happening again. The origin of 
the crisis was the fact that Thai economy grew too fast with the help of the financial liberalization 
in early 1990s. This rapid growth, however, violated the three elements of the sufficiency 
economy, which are moderation, reasonableness and self-immunity, in turns, exposed the country 
to trouble. On July 2, 1997, Thai land had to let the baht float freely, and that when the crisis 
started. More than ten years have passed, and we believe that we will not make the same mistakes 
again if we follow the sufficiency economy philosophy. The application of the philosophy is not 
limited only to the national level, but it is applicable to people from all walks of life at all levels. 
The philosophy can be boiled down to five axioms; (1) know what you are doing; (2) be honest 
and persevere; (3) take middle path; (4) be sensible and insightful in taking decisions; (5) build 
protection against shocks despite different applications, they all share the same goal of balanced 
and sustainable development. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
ntil mid-1997, the dramatic growth of the Asian economies was widely regarded as a miracle, and 
Thailand was part of this miracle as well. Within days, the Thai government was forces to abandon the 
peg of the baht to the dollar on July 2, 1997, as a result, the currency crisis spread rapidly throughout the 
region and beyond. 
 
 Now, ten years have passed since the financial crisis. In many ways, an air of normality as returned. But, 
despite, the recovery, it  is perhaps time to look back at the causes of the crisis, the lessons learnt and what can be 
done to prevent the crisis from happening again. As a result of the financial crisis, His Majesty the King Bhumibol 
Adulyadej advised Thai people to change their economic philosophy in order to cope with present economic 
adversity and withstand economic insecurity. His Majesty’s words have become known as the philosophy of 
“Sufficiency Economy”. The sufficiency economy is a philosophy bestowed by His Majesty the King to his subjects 
through royal remarks on many occasions over the past three decades. The philosophy provides guidance on 
appropriate conduct covering numerous aspects of life that will lead to a sustainable way of living, be able to meet 
the challenges arising from globalization and other changes. After the economic crisis in 1997, His Majesty 
reiterated and expanded on the Sufficiency Economy in remarks made in December 1997 and 1998. The philosophy 
points the way for recovery that will lead to more resilient and sustainable economy, better able to meet the 
challenges arising from globalization and other changes
1
. According to his Majesty the King, Sufficiency Economy 
is a philosophy that stresses the middle path as an overriding principle for appropriate conduct by the people at all 
levels. This applies conduct starting from the level of the families, communities, as well as the level of nation in 
development and administration so as to modernize in line with forces of globalization. “Sufficiency” means 
moderation, reasonableness, and the need for self-immunity for sufficient protection from impact arising from 
internal and external changes. To achieve this, an application of knowledge with due consideration and prudence is 
                                            
1 The 1999 TDRI Year-End Conference Distribution Material 
U 
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essential. At the same time, it is important to strengthen the moral fiber of the nation, so that everyone, particularly 
public officials, academic, businessmen at all levels, adheres first and foremost to the principles of honesty and 
integrity. In addition, a way of life based on patience, perseverance, diligence, wisdom and prudence to create 
balance and be able to cope appropriately with critical challenges arising from extensive and rapid socioeconomic, 
environmental, and cultural changes in the world
2
. The philosophy of the sufficiency economy includes three 
elements: moderation, reasonableness and self-immunity, and requires two conditions for the philosophy to work: 
knowledge and ethics, as illustrated in the following diagram; 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOT-SO-SUFFICIENT BEHAVIORS PRIOR TO THE CRISIS 
 
We will take a look back on the Thai economy during the pre-crisis period, using the sufficiency economy 
philosophy, in order to analyze what went wrong that led to the financial crisis in 1997. In the decade leading up to 
the crisis, economic growth in Thailand averaged 8.6 percent a year. In the middle and late 1980s, a remarkable 
combination of international phenomena came together to “make a miracle” in Thailand: an acceleration of real 
economic growth from about 6 percent per year in l976-1985 to above 8 percent in 1986-1995. At its peak in 1988-
1990, growth averaged 12 percent per year. Low wages, progressive reductions in trade barriers, and years of 
conservative macroeconomic management resulting in low inflation and a stable exchange rate made the Thai 
economy an ideal host for a flood of foreign investment in the late 1980s, especially that from Japan after the Plaza 
Accord and the subsequent appreciation of the yen relative to the US dollar. The same factors enabled Thai 
exporters to ride a tremendous wave of growth in global trade from the mid-1980s. However, an assessment of 
Thailand’s past development reveals imbalance and inflexibility in many ways that is developmental achievements 
appear in the form of quantity rather than quality.  While Thailand has made great progress in reducing poverty, the 
income gap is still very large. Basic infrastructure has expanded nationwide, but the distribution is not balanced and 
more importantly, the quality is uneven. Thailand’s development has resulted in better health and education of a 
large number of people; however, the quality does not match the quantity. Services do not cover all targeted areas. 
At the same time, ethics, morals and disciplines have weakened. The administration and institutions such as political 
sector, public sector, private businesses, communities and family, do not have the necessary tools to protect them 
from internal and external volatility. 
 
Our experiences in the past confirmed that Thailand exposed itself to the globalization excessively; 
therefore, put the country into trouble by violating the three elements of the sufficiency economy’s philosophy, as 
following; 
 
 
                                            
2 Summarized from H.M. the King’s remarks related to sufficiency economy on various occasions. 
Moderation 
Self-Immunity   Reasonableness 
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Moderation:  The households’ saving rate in Thailand declined from approximately 14 percent in 1988 to 
approximately 5 percent in 1996, which shows the pattern of over-consumption. Moreover, private businesses 
resorted to debt rather than equity to finance investment, especially short-term foreign debt which was the result 
from the financial liberalization in the early 1990s. The financial liberalization in Thailand started to create problems 
that led to the crisis in 1997. Of all the financial liberalization measures, the establishment of offshore banking 
facilities, known as the Bangkok International Banking Facilities (BIBFs), was the most important.  BIBFs were 
introduced in 1993 in order to facilitate and reduce the cost of international borrowing while encouraging foreign 
capital inflows to finance domestic investment and investment throughout South East Asia. However, financial 
liberalization, aimed to promoting stiffer competition among financial institutions, brought in excessive capital 
inflows and foreign borrowing too quickly and beyond moderation as guided in sufficiency economy. The easier 
access to the funds together with the nature of the Thai financial system, where banks and other financial institutions 
were mostly family-owned, nepotism led to corrupted lending practices brought about the crisis. The violation the 
moderation element of the sufficiency economy resulted in excessive borrowing and lending by financial institutions 
as well as excessive investing, especially in land and real estate during the economic boom in the 1990s. The 
evidence on the lending boom in the 1990s is provided by the data on the growth of bank credit to private sector in 
Table 1, and the ratio of private sector lending to GDP in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 1. Bank Lending to Private Sector (% growth) 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Korea 20.78 12.55 12.94 20.08 15.45 20.01 21.95 
Indonesia 17.82 12.29 25.48 22.97 22.57 21.45 46.42 
Malaysia 20.58 10.79 10.80 16.04 30.65 25.77 26.96 
Philippines 7.33 24.66 40.74 26.52 45.39 48.72 28.79 
Singapore 12.41 9.77 15.15 15.25 20.26 15.82 12.68 
Thailand 20.45 20.52 24.03 30.26 23.76 14.63 19.80 
Hong Kong  10.17 20.15 19.94 10.99 15.75 20.10 
China 19.76 20.84 43.52 24.58 24.23 24.68 20.96 
Taiwan 21.25 28.70 19.46 16.18 10.00 6.00 8.92 
Source: NBER Working Paper No.6833 
 
 
Table 2. Bank Lending to Private Sector (% GDP) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Korea 52.54 52.81 53.34 54.21 56.84 57.04 61.81 69.79 
Indonesia 49.67 50.32 49.45 48.90 51.88 53.48 55.42 69.23 
Malaysia 71.36 75.29 74.72 74.06 74.61 84.80 93.39 106.91 
Philippines 19.17 17.76 20.44 26.37 29.06 37.52 48.98 56.53 
Singapore 82.20 83.34 85.06 84.14 84.21 90.75 95.96 100.29 
Thailand 64.30 67.70 72.24 80.01 91.00 97.62 101.94 116.33 
Hong Kong  141.84 134.20 140.02 149.00 155.24 162.36 174.24 
China 85.51 87.87 86.17 95.49 87.12 85.83 91.65 101.07 
Taiwan 100.41 108.99 126.43 137.23 146.89 149.49 146.05 146.23 
Source: NBER Working Paper No.6833 
 
 
Reasonableness: The financial liberalization allowed easier access to funds from abroad. Since most of the credits 
were on a short-term basis and continually rolled over for long-term use, it created a problem of maturity 
mismatching. Moreover, during the period leading up to the crisis, Thailand also faced quality problem of the loans 
where the funds used to finance investments of dubious profitability or speculative purchase of existing financial 
assets such as investments in real estate and property sectors, resulting in non-performing loans arise from these 
risky and poor performing projects as shown in Table 3.  
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Table 3. Non-Performing Loans (as proportion of total lending in 1996) 
Korea 8% 
Indonesia 13% 
Malaysia 10% 
Philippines 14% 
Singapore 4% 
Thailand 13% 
Hong Kong 3% 
China 14% 
Taiwan 4% 
Source: 1997 BIS Annual Report 
 
 
This event was against the reasonableness element of the sufficiency economy, and fueled a spree of 
speculative spending practices in many sectors of the Thai economy which finally led to the crisis. More 
importantly, the origin of problems of the Thai financial system was the concentration of bank ownership. Family-
owned banks caused imprudent managements, such as unscrupulous lending practices, maturity mismatching and 
excessive exchange risks: the basket pegged exchange rate system encouraged large, unhedged foreign borrowing 
because the pegged exchange rate eliminated risks from borrowing in foreign currencies thus when the Bank of 
Thailand floated the baht on July 2, 1997, foreign debt values were raised and the crisis was exacerbated. Moreover, 
fierce competition in the region to become a financial center also led to policy implementation that aims to attract 
investment and capital inflows with less careful risk assessment. 
 
Self-Immunity: At the macro level, macroeconomic policy did not provide appropriate immunization against 
external volatility. The country lacked mechanisms to balance risks from volatility from financial liberalization with 
the potential benefits liberalization offered. The fact that domestic banks borrowed heavily from foreign banks but 
lent mostly to domestic investors, and a very large fraction of foreign debt accumulation was in the form of short-
term, unhedged, foreign-currency dominate liabilities which exposed the Thai economy to the risks of easily 
reversing of short-term capital and foreign exchange rate fluctuations. In normal times high foreign liabilities may 
not cause a concern, as short-term foreign debts are easily rolled over. In the presence of rapid currency 
depreciation, however, this may cause serious financial problems especially if the foreign borrowing is in foreign 
currency, while the domestic lending is in domestic currency. Foreign lenders might suddenly refuse to roll over 
short-term lines for credit to domestic banks, precipitating the crisis as happened in 1997. Moreover, the debt 
denominated in foreign currencies ended up exacerbating the exchange rate crisis, as the depreciation of the baht 
increased the real burden of foreign debts. In other words, Thailand’s financial status was tied to other countries’ 
economic activities, therefore, made itself vulnerable to external shocks, sudden switches in market confidence and 
sentiment, which was driven by deteriorating expectation about the poor state of fundamentals. In 1997 the drop of 
the real estate and stock markets, where sustained speculative trends were mostly fueled by foreign capital inflows, 
led to the emergence of wide losses and outright defaults in the corporate and financial sectors, and rapid reversals 
of financial capital inflows led to collapse of the baht amidst domestic and international investors panic. Apart from 
being financially independent, Thailand also relied heavily on international trade (Table 4), which tied its economy 
even more closely to foreign countries’, since greater trade openness also makes the country more vulnerable to 
terms of trade shocks and to restrictive trade policies in trade partner countries. These financially as well as trade 
dependency caused Thailand to lack self-immunity element of the sufficiency economy philosophy. 
 
 
Table 4. Trade Openness ((Exports+Imports)/2 as a % of GDP) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Korea 30.04 29.38 29.38 29.04 30.47 33.59 34.36 38.48 
Indonesia 26.30 27.18 28.23 25.26 25.94 26.98 26.13 28.22 
Malaysia 75.23 86.52 76.64 87.72 92.15 97.42 91.50 93.55 
Philippines 30.40 31.09 31.58 35.58 36.98 40.26 44.90 54.20 
Thailand 37.76 39.24 38.98 39.69 40.99 44.88 42.19 46.69 
Hong Kong 129.93 135.28 140.37 137.18 138.92 151.67 142.28 132.68 
Taiwan 44.27 45.14 42.34 43.29 43.16 47.80 46.63 48.07 
Source: NBER Working Paper No.6833 
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WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
 
Past development has led to a society that is too receptive of external influences without due screening. The 
liberalization policy was implemented without sufficient institutional preparation. The country also lacked 
appropriate warning systems, immunity and mechanism to adjust itself in time of crisis.  While opening to trade and 
capital flows have benefited the country in its development and growth, negative effect of external volatility need 
careful assessment and management. Development of the financial and capital markets in the sufficiency economy 
perspective primarily lies in the need to foster the country’s immunization against external volatility. The country 
should promote higher level of domestic saving, lower level of dependence on external capital. Equally important is 
the development of efficient and diversified capital markets with sufficient instrument in order to make wise 
choices, while borrowers should have appropriate mechanisms to tap long-term domestic savings. At the same time, 
strong financial institutions should be able to manage external volatility to the level that it is not harmful to the 
organizations and the overall system.  Strength of financial institutions can be instilled through promotion of good 
governance and ethics among financial executives. Strong financial institutions should distribute needed credit to 
local communities and small investors with relevant potential, not only to strong investors. Appropriate financial 
strategies and foreign exchange rate are also important factors in the process of immunizing the country against 
external volatility. A flexible foreign exchange rate and inflation targeting serve as a viable option in line with the 
perspective of the sufficiency economy.  
 
From the experiences during the 1997 crisis, the Office of the National Economic and Social Development 
Board (NESDB) has adopted the sufficiency economy bestowed by His Majesty the King as a guiding philosophy in 
the 10
th
 National Economic and Social Development plan, which has the objectives of (1) people-centered 
development; (2) balancing between three capitals: economic, social, natural resources and environment, and (3) 
leading to the green and happiness society. Nevertheless, the application of the philosophy is not limited to the 
national level. The philosophy is applicable to people from all walks of life and at all level as shown in the table 5. 
 
 
Table 5 
Level of application Application of the philosophy of sufficiency economy 
Individual and house hold - Reasonable behavior in investment and consumption(e.g. better individual and family 
financial planning, limiting unnecessary luxurious  consumption) 
- Ethical behavior 
- Altruistic behavior 
Corporate Sector - Risk consciousness/ awareness 
- Good corporate governance 
- Corporate social responsibility 
- Ethical/ responsible to stakeholders 
Economic Policy - Conscience in economic management (fiscal discipline, etc.) 
- Business growth and stability 
- Sustainable growth/ suitable development 
- Fair distribution 
- Fair competition 
- Immunization against global risks 
- Strengthening impoverished rural communities 
 
 
 Despite different applications, they share the same goal of balanced and sustainable development. In 
conclusion, if Thai people as a whole can follow the middles path guided by the sufficiency economy, know what 
you are doing, be honest and persevere, take a middle path, avoid extremes, be sensible and insightful in making 
decisions, and build protection against shocks. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The fundamental approach to the sufficiency economy is the holistic adaptation of attitude, behavior, and 
way of life both the micro and macro levels. For concrete realization, application of the philosophy needs due 
consideration, prudence, determination and patience. It should be noted that the sufficiency economy concept is 
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much broader than self-sufficiency. It emphasizes the middle path approach as mode of conduct by all groups to 
achieve moderation in life. Sufficiency means satisfying enough, minimizing greedy, being reasonable, and applying 
moderation. It enables people to better cope with external and internal shocks and live more sustainable. Without 
them, one cannot achieve sufficiency economy. 
 
 The sufficiency economy philosophy is not against but, on the other hand, in support of the market 
economy regime. The concept of good governance embodied and implied by the philosophy could verify that it, in 
fact, complements the market economy philosophy. If, for example, all participants in business activity focus on the 
application of good governance, a market economy can certainly function more effectively without fraud, corruption 
and distortion and, hence, result in better economic efficiency and performance. 
 
The lessons learnt from the financial crisis in 1997 and the not-so-sufficient economic behaviors in the past   
remind and keep all Thai in perspective. With the sufficiency economy concept as a guidance of economic activities 
as well as ways of life, hopefully, Thailand will be able to develop with a balanced strategy so as to modernize in 
line with the force of globalization while shielding against inevitable shocks and excesses that arise occurring as a 
result of globalization. Ultimately, we will not have to go through such a crisis again.  
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